


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AN ADDRESS BY HENRY L. TURNER,

LIEUTENANT-COLONEL FIRST INFANTRY, I. N. G.

DELIVERED BEFORE THE
ILLINOIS NATIONAL GUARD ASSOCIATION,
DECEMBER 5, 1889.

THE
ARMY'S OUTSTRETCHED HAND—

SHALL NOT THE NATIONAL GUARD GRASP IT?

An Address

Delivered before the Illinois National Guard Association,

BY

HENRY L. TURNER,

LIEUTENANT-COLONEL FIRST INFANTRY, I. N. G.

IN

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
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THE

ARMY'S OUTSTRETCHED HAND.

SHALL NOT THE NATIONAL GUARD GRASP IT?

IN the last analysis, every human government, however popular or benign, is based on force. Thus far in the history of the race crises have periodically arisen in every nation and community when an appeal to arms has been the only preservative of honor and of order. These crises have recurred quite as frequently during the now closing century as ever before, and until the far millenium arrives they can be safely counted on. Hence it is that every nation is forced by the logic of past events to consider war as not only a possible but probable contingency, and to make preparation for its own protection.

For its military defense the United States has its land force, which is divided into two distinct, and in many important features, dissimilar bodies—the Regular Army and the National Guard. Up to a very recent date there has been comparatively little intercourse or sympathy between them, and no unity of purpose; but to-day the Army stands with hand outstretched seeking an alliance with the National Guard. For the past few years the desire on the part of the Regular Army to come into closer relations with it has been apparent. The detailing of regular officers for special duty in the state encampments, the recent assignment of officers to permanent duties amongst us, the frequent published articles by army authorities on the best methods of handling and improving

the National Guard, the sending of a body of troops to one or two of the state encampments of this year, the annual reports of the Adjutant General and the Commanding General of the Army, and, finally, the report of the Secretary of War, all treating somewhat fully of National Guard matters, are cumulative proof of the fact that to-day the Regular Army stands, as I have said, with hand outstretched, asking for a closer union with the National Guard.

Is it not time, then, comrades, that the Guard, on its part, should give a clear, unmistakable evidence of the friendliness and desire for a closer union with our comrades of the permanent establishment, which, I am convinced, is almost universal amongst us to-day?

The past five years have been years of rapid development and change, not only in the accepted ideas as to methods of warfare, but in the standards of the Army of the United States, and above all, of growth and maturing efficiency in the Guard itself. We are by no means the organization that we were five years ago. We have gained experience, strength and standing in the community, with better knowledge of our scope and limitations, and a clearer conception of the great future which lies before us. It is due to this changed condition of the Guard itself, more than to anything else, that our friends of the Regular Army are to-day giving so much of their thought and study to the best means of unifying and rendering available for national defense this developing, but as yet incomplete and inharmonious organization.

There lies before us, if we are wise to see and avail ourselves of the opening opportunity, an assured position as the main defensive support of our country. We can, if we will, cast off the childish, ill-fitting, inadequate garments which have called down upon us the ridicule of our own people and press for years past, and don the habiliments of a full-grown, self-respecting, united, harmonious body of defensive soldiery. Shall we not, on our part, take the hand of the national establishment which is stretched out to help us up

into this position of honor and responsibility? Now is the day, and now is the hour. Are we the men for the time and the opportunity?

As you doubtless know, the Adjutant General of the Army, in an article in the November number of the *Forum*, has made certain recommendations looking to the greater efficiency of the National Guard. It is in reference to these recommendations, as evidencing a desire and suggesting a plan for closer relations between the two branches of the service, that I desire your attention for a time. The recommendation of most importance is as follows:

"I have the honor to recommend that Congress be asked to authorize (on the application of the Governor of a state having an armed militia force of not less than 5,000 men) the muster into the service of the United States for a period of forty days of a battalion of ten selected companies, of thirty men each, made up from regiments of the National Guard of that state, for the purpose of serving with the United States troops in one of the summer camps of instruction west of the Mississippi River; the enlisted men of this selected force, after such muster and while on duty, to be entitled to double the pay and allowances authorized by present laws to volunteer forces called into the service of the Government. Such a provision is necessary to minimize, for the officers and men, the hardships (personal and pecuniary) of an enforced absence from their families and ordinary avocations."

The first questions that arise regarding this recommendation are the all-important ones, "Is it feasible?" "What are the steps to be taken to carry it into effect, and what are the difficulties to be overcome?" Should these questions be answered affirmatively then the further questions would arise:

"Is the plan one, which, if carried out would be for the highest and best interests of the National Guard, the Army, the State and the Nation? Would sufficient benefits accrue to both branches of the service to warrant a united effort on the part of the Army and the Guard to secure from Congress

the authority and the money with which to put the plan in practical operation?"

The objection has been raised that Congress could not lawfully, under the Constitution, call out the National Guard for purposes of instruction. But after a full and exhaustive study of the question, I am fully convinced that the plan is wholly within the law and the Constitution.

While the Constitution undoubtedly prohibits the calling out of the militia except in the case of invasion, riot or insurrection, let us remember and mark it down, once for all, that the National Guard is not militia, in any sense whatever, neither in fact nor in the eye of the law or the Constitution. The service of the militia is compulsory, that of the Guardsman wholly voluntary; it, the Guard, is the volunteer force of the states, as the Army is the volunteer force of the General Government. Referring to the militiaman, the people, through the Constitution, have said to Congress: "Because this man's service is compulsory, because we have given you the right to take him from his home and labor at any hour of any day or night, therefore we forbid you to call upon him except in the last extremity, namely: to repel invasion or to put down riot or insurrection." Nowhere, however, does the Constitution limit the power of Congress to accept a voluntary service. On the contrary, in conferring the broad right to "raise armies," it has included the lesser power, the necessary, sequent, corollary power, to take such steps as it may deem essential to raise its armies promptly and secure their highest efficiency when called into the field. Let me repeat it—the National Guardsman is in no sense a militiaman. The militia system is dead, and deserved to die because of its inefficiency; the National Guard, differing in plan and scope, differing in purpose and in principle, is just coming into vigorous manhood. From the tip of his big bearskin tub of a cap, down through his yellow-faced frock and baggy breeches, the old militiaman is no more like the trim, clear-cut, alert, enthusiastic Guardsman of to-day, than a toy soldier is like the heroic Six Hundred, who,

with their flashing sabres, struck the bells of glory and set them ringing for all time, down on the field of Balaklava. The attempt to billet the Guardsman and the militiaman together in one bed and smother them with a constitutional blanket, must result in failure. The men are of different size and make, and the blanket is not big enough. But even should it be held that the National Guard are in fact and under the law militia and nothing else, still these battalions could unquestionably be sent to the National Encampments, as militia, under their own officers, and the expense paid by the General Government through appropriations apportioned to the several states sending them. I say to you, therefore, once again, comrades, there is no insurmountable constitutional difficulty in the way of the execution of this plan, and in saying so I am not forced to join with Uncle Josh Whitcomb in the play and say that "I could prove it, if old Bill Jones were alive." My "Bill Jones" is very much alive, and has the documents with him.

Having thus ascertained that there is no insurmountable constitutional difficulty impending, let us see whether it is practicable to secure from Congress the desired authority and the necessary appropriation to carry this movement into effect. With an ever burdening and constantly increasing surplus in its treasury, with the Regular Army establishment eager for the accomplishment of this purpose, with the National Guard united in demanding such recognition with every incentive of self-interest before it, with the state organizations behind the movement, what possible reason should there be why the representatives of the nation should not do this worthy and creditable act? It is my belief, after inquiry and long consideration, that we have but to ask to receive.

But the query arises further, supposing that Congress should do its part, the state should give its consent, would it be possible to secure from the regiments of the states, sufficient men who would give their services for forty days, as proposed, and if the requisite number could be found is it probable that

a fair sized battalion from each state could be organized whose members would find it possible to leave their avocations for so long a time? Of course the answer to this is, to a certain degree, a matter of conjecture, but inquiry among the rank and file of our own regiment, has developed the fact that of the entire number upon our roster, ninety per cent. would willingly give their services for this purpose, were they able to get away, and that we could, in any event, take into camp nearly, if not quite, one hundred and fifty men. If out of one regiment, and that a city regiment, where the difficulty of getting leave of absence from the various avocations in which the command is engaged, is largely more difficult than would be true of the regiments throughout the country districts—if it be true, I say, that one hundred and fifty men could be taken from such a regiment, is there any question that full battalions could be easily raised among the regiments which compose the Guard of the several states?

Proceeding with our investigation, the question arises, "Is the plan one which would benefit the Guard?"

The annual union of picked battalions from the several states, in a month's actual campaigning, with the officers and men of the regular force, would necessarily cultivate a closer interest and warmer sympathy between the two branches of the service. If there have been any jealousies on the part of either towards the other, they would pass away under the influence of the close comradeship which would arise through the commingling of the men and officers of certain portions of each army, year by year, in the actual duties, pleasures and excitements of field manœuvring; and whatever tends to cement the different departments of the national defensive force together, is good for every branch of it, for the states which form the union, and for the nation as a whole. By means of these yearly "experience meetings" the National Guard would gain a species of practical drill which as yet it has had no taste of. The old strength of the Guard, viz.: its proficiency and precision in the manual of arms and company

drill, is growing of less and less value year by year, by reason of the changed principles which are coming to underly the art of war. The thing of prime importance to the military organization now is, that the soldier should be familiarized with and trained to meet the actual practical necessities and conditions which would surround him in time of war. Individualism is the striking feature of military science to-day; the individual soldier, therefore, should understand how to bear himself in soldierly fashion in every situation which is likely to confront him in actual service. In these national encampments, the soldier learns how to cover long distances with the least fatigue and distress. How to care for his feet. How to care for his general health. How to prepare his own food when conveniences are lacking. How to make his own bed with neither bricks nor straw at hand. How to meet surprises. How to bear himself in sudden emergencies,. How to take advantage for purposes of protection of every little change and feature in the landscape. How to do picket and out-post duty in the enemy's front. How to cross bottomless marshes and unfordable rivers.

The officer learns through actual experience how to look after the health of his men. How to save their strength and spirit on long and arduous marches. How to conduct an advance guard in the presence of an enemy. How to protect a retreating army. Regiments and battalions learn how to move in brigade and division masses, and officers and men alike come to know what are the requisites of manhood necessary to make the perfect soldier in times of actual service. Each man and officer is able to test himself and learn where his own strength and weakness as military factors lie. There would be growing up in our midst year by year, an increasing number of practical, campaign trained soldiers, a nucleus for a veteran volunteer force which could, and doubtless would, serve as an instructive leaven for the whole body of the Guard. Therefore, I answer, that for this reason alone the movement would be an advantage to the National Guard.

But, further, such a movement, carrying with it, as it neces-

sarily would, a closer union with the professional soldiers of the country, acting as it would upon both our own people and the state legislators as an object lesson, showing the high regard in which the only military authority in the country holds us, would speedily and thoroughly awaken the interest of our citizens in our progress and well-being. The non-military mind in all military matters takes its cue from the highest visible military authority. The citizen of Illinois may, to-day, apparently does, to-day, have but slight regard for the body of citizen soldiers located about him. But let it become apparent that the Secretary of War, the Commanding General, the regular officers of every grade from highest to lowest, believe in and approve of and are glad to co-operate with the National Guard, and the citizen will at once discover that he has always considered the National Guard one of the finest institutions of the United States, and that nothing has ever, or can ever, give him greater pleasure than to go deep down into his pocket for its support. For this reason, also, then, I say it would benefit the Guard.

The military is the outward evidence of the country's vital power—it is the spectacular side of patriotism. To the child there comes with the sound of martial music, with the waving flag, the measured tread of uniformed men, his first conception of that mighty, intangible, invisible entity—the Nation—and his little soul swells with the first awakenings of that strongest, noblest of all human sentiments—the love of country. The people love the military, they believe in it; it is the occasional vision of the passing of the blue-coated masses which more than all else serves to keep alive in their hearts a warm, ever abiding devotion to Columbia. They will be proud of the National Guard if we can but give them an organization worthy of their pride. The sole reason for public indifference to-day is the fact that the people as a whole do not believe in the efficiency of the Guard. If you do not credit this statement, try to build an armory by popular subscription! While we have many warm friends amongst the citizens, there are many who will say, and still more who

will think without saying it, what a prominent man of Chicago said to me: "National Guard! Militia! Why, I'd rather have one company of regulars than all the National Guard in the state." While it is true that Americans would not tolerate a large standing army, yet if we can show them that there is in their midst a strong, silent, closely woven, effective body of trained soldiers—soldiers, yet citizens—under military rule, yet not idlers, but wage-workers,—ready at a moment's notice to spring to their defense, they—the people—will stand behind us with their pride at high pressure and their pockets blown wide open. It is because this movement tends to make us worthier of their pride, because the touch of the regulars will waken that pride in our favor more quickly than anything else, that I believe in it.

If once the Government could be induced to loosen its purse-strings for our benefit, there are a thousand ways in which our efficiency could be increased. For instance, if the Adjutant and Inspector of Rifle Practice in every regiment could be salaried officers and give up their whole service to the good of the command, would not that be a great step forward? Or, better still, if this process of union should progress to the point where, without friction or dissatisfaction, upon application from the regimental commanders, details could be made from amongst the younger officers of the permanent establishment for special duty upon the regimental staff of National Guard Regiments as Adjutants and Inspectors of small arms practice, would not the Guard be the gainer? And would not a wide field of usefulness be opened to many young officers of the Army who are to-day rotting away their lives in enforced idleness and dissipation?

Therefore, it seems to me, for all these reasons, that the question answers itself and loudly in the affirmative, that such a yearly union of a portion of its forces in these practical encampments, side by side with its better trained, more experienced and better informed comrades of the regular establishment, would be in itself a great boon to us—and as a long

step toward unity with the permanent establishment, would be boundlessly valuable to the National Guard.

But the further question arises, "What possible benefit could come to the Army?"

In replying I would say, that while there is much for the Guard to learn from the Army, there are many things of importance that the Army could learn from us. The progress towards formations in open order has made individualism the distinguishing feature of military change to-day. It follows, therefore, that the grade of men who must hereafter make up our armies, is to be higher than anything known heretofore. And on this fact hinges another, viz.: that the treatment of the common soldier by his commanding officer must be of a different character from the often brutal, uniformly indifferent method which has characterized our own Army, as well as those of other countries. The officer of the Regular Army needs to learn how to treat the common soldier, as a thinking, feeling, human being; he needs to learn that it is not necessary to the highest discipline that he should divorce himself in every way from the men under his command. The National Guard officers can teach him this. They have learned and are past masters in the art of maintaining discipline over men while in uniform, whom they are glad to receive into their homes and at their firesides when out of service. The officers of the Regular Army can teach us how to rapidly construct out of scant materials effective cover in the open field. We can teach them how to support on scant appropriations undiscouraged battalions of earnest men. They can teach us how to bear the privations of campaigning, how to put up with discomfort, and often with distress. We can teach them how to bear patiently the lack of appreciation on the part of the public of our earnest efforts for the national good, how to bear slights and ridicule without complaint, and without loss of self-respect or any diminution of our enthusiasm for the service. They can give us many a valuable suggestion in the multitudinous minutiae of military instruction. We can give to them

something of the freedom and broadness which comes to the citizen soldier through the untrammelled roominess of civil life. It would benefit the Regular Army further in that its enlisted men might mingle for a time with the higher grade of soldiers in the National Guard, catch something of their enthusiasm, and their spirit of self-sacrifice, their devotion to the state. They, the regulars, can teach us much that will be of value as to the duties and course of action which an officer should pursue under the varying, often difficult, circumstances of military life. We can give to them a knowledge of the value of a strong personal interest and sympathy with the men who come under our command. And each could help the other to a fuller realization of the fact that the officer is a power in his position for either good or evil, over the lives and character of the men he commands; that it is his prime and highest duty to be a model, an example for his command in all that pertains to the life of the soldier, the gentleman, the citizen, the patriot.

But it may be asked what benefit can accrue to the state from such a movement. The answer is swift and plain that the state, without expense to itself, would gain for its own troops a drill and practical preparation which would make it doubly effective for its own defence whenever threatened—without effort or cost on its own part, and without infringement upon its own rights and authority, there would be gained for itself and the Guard added efficiency and strength.

If it be asked what would be the gain for the nation, the answer is equally ready and equally obvious. Under the new methods of warfare, with its immensely improved and deadly machinery, war will henceforth be short, sharp and decisive. With a well-organized and equipped enemy at our doors, like that of Germany, which in 1870 moved on France like a tornado, who can doubt that the United States, with its little handful of scattered regulars and its heterogeneous, loosely strung citizen soldiery, would be whipped beyond hope before it could get into action. Any movement which tends to unify,

solidify this at present disunited, unsystematized body of enthusiastic soldiery, must make for the good of the nation, in that it would increase the measure of its readiness for prompt defensive action. The National Guard of to-day, while efficient and worthy in many respects, is yet an inharmonious, ill-cemented body, governed by varying and sometimes conflicting rules and regulations in different parts of the country. Its target practice differs so greatly in different sections, that no comparison can be made between the relative merits of the record as shown in Illinois and in New York, as shown in Wisconsin and Massachusetts, each differing from the other, and all from the standard under which regular army competitions are held. Difference in uniform, difference in customs, which have grown up through independent action, are still maintained. This movement looks to a simplifying of the establishment, to unifying its rifle practice, each state with the other, and all with the Regular Army, of cementing the entire body of national defensive troops into one complete, harmonious whole. Would not this be a great gain to the nation? The country would have ready at hand, in case of emergency, a thoroughly equipped, thoroughly organized, body of troops, soldiers yet producers, with a cost to itself, which, when compared with that expended by any other nation on the globe, is but a pittance. Backbone, steadiness, and solidity would be given to public order, and the nation would gain in respect and dignity among other nations of the globe,—its people would be safer when under other flags, its rights would be less boldly attacked, and its good nature less frequently imposed upon. For every other nation upon the globe to-day is practically a military nation; standards of national judgment are military standards; therefore, when the United States can show to England, Mexico, France and Germany, that it has at its command an efficient army of one hundred thousand men, with a highly drilled, highly educated crack corps of twenty-five thousand regulars, in addition, the stars and stripes will be looked upon in the four quarters of the globe with

added confidence by its own wandering citizens, and with deeper respect by strangers. Already the nation's re-animation and re-habilitation of the Navy is tending to lift it up in the regard of other countries; let it follow up the good work by adding to its elements of strength this muscular but as yet untrained arm of the National Guard. A story is told of an advertisement in a Dakota newspaper, reading as follows: "If John Jones, who deserted his wife and baby twenty-one years ago, will return to his family, the said baby will lick him into kingdom come." Many years ago Uncle Sam begot a lusty infant which he has shamefully neglected; let him awake to the fact that this infant is now grown to full manhood, and has donned his fighting clothes; let him give to it the fostering care and parental regard which is its due, and which it is to his highest interest that it should have.

The whole trend of affairs witnesses that the movement in the direction outlined is already under way, that for years it has silently been gathering force and headway, that to-day it is almost at the full tide of its strength. It has become the wish of the Army, it is fast becoming the desire of the more progressive of the Guard, and it has gained, and is gaining the support of our most patriotic citizens. It is a movement out of the depths, and like a mighty tidal wave will sweep aside all opposition. The East is moving. Already, Wisconsin, by the prompt action of its efficient and enterprising Adjutant-General, is swinging into line. Iowa, roused by the call of some of her most enthusiastic and progressive officers, is coming up to the color line at double time. Shall Illinois lag halting in the rear? No, no, comrades! Let the command ring out, "By the State, Right Front into line, march!"

It has often been said to me that the greatest obstacle in the way of such a movement would be the jealousies arising between the officers of the Guard itself—the desire to secure each for himself whatever of credit or glory might lie abroad—the unwillingness of the states to act in concert—and state fears of national aggression. But surely coöperation

is not inconsistent with undivided state authority. Surely, when state and national interests lie in the same direction, there can be no danger in marching side by side along the same highway.

And if there has been success in securing concert and uniformity of action on the part of the states in commercial and political affairs, why not in military?

And, comrades, as to the jealousies and self-seeking amongst our own members, let me speak in perfect frankness. I am comparatively a new-comer amongst you, being now but about two years in the service, and yet I have heard much of this topic; the motive of self-interest has been made too prominent. The prime argument used in recruiting has been the benefit to be gained by the recruit, not the worthiness of the service he could render. Officers are reported as testing every proposition by the question, "What is there in it for me?" I am told that to-day the Guard of this state owes a diminution in the annual appropriation, not so much to disaffection on the part of the state as to discord in its own ranks. Standing here in the independence which is born of an earnest desire for the highest well-being of the Guard, I say to you that the hour for self-interest has passed—its doom has struck. I believe in the devotion and patriotism of the vast majority of our number, yet if there are any unworthy ones upon the roster, let me say to them, that already their discharges are being written by a power higher than that of state or nation, by the mighty hand of coming events. Officers of the National Guard, a new era is upon us. As you stand in the hither edge of night, and watch the stars grow dim and the first faint streaks of light creep over the mountains, it needs no messenger to say to you that morning is at hand. Comrades, for us a new day is breaking. The spirit of individualism has sounded reveille; and already the common soldier is up and awake—common no longer, but dignified, elevated, ennobled. Out of the machine-made soldier of the dark ages, with his wooden ignorance, his dense stupidity and his heart that beat by the

turning of a crank, the process of evolution is bringing us a sentient being, eager, earnest, alert, watchful and determined that only true men shall be put in commission over him. The great, pulsing, loyal, multitudinous heart of the rank and file is rousing up to the consciousness that IT is the life and the soul of the National Guard—ay, of the national defensive power itself. This is a movement which is growing from the bottom up. Do you demand proof? Let me cite the astonishing fact, that in two years' time not less than seventeen National Guard journals have arisen and find their support largely amongst the privates and non-commissioned officers; that the *Guardman*, the parent of them all, is soon to become a weekly. What does this mean, if not that the Guard is forging to the front as a matter of public interest? If you would see that the grade of intelligence and worth amongst the men whom we command is rising, let me cite the indisputable fact that the days of card-playing and vulgarity during armory hours are fast giving place to days of earnest study and discussion; that in our own regiment—as in many others, I doubt not—there are men serving to-day as privates who could handle a battalion superbly; and, lastly, let me cite the fact that during the encampment of 1889, instead of the rigid censorship of the old time camp-guard, the First Regiment was put upon its honor, and the parole was not dishonored but in a single instance. Not only are the enlisted men of the Guard closely scrutinizing our actions, but the press has turned its piercing light upon us and is seeking the joints of our armor.

Therefore, I say to you if there be amongst us any who are selfish, any here for personal gain or political preferment, if there be amongst our number one single officer whose heart does not “beat true to Poll,” let him fly to the mountains, for the day of reckoning is at hand. The men are on the outer walls, and henceforth no knight will be allowed to pass the portals, be his bearing and his trappings what they may, upon whose banner is inscribed that most despicable of all

mottoes, "Nothing for the Guard, but everything for Number One." Henceforth the watchword shall be, "Everything, everything for the Guard, and all that's left for me."

From now on the trend of fate will force us into competition in the grace of unrequited generosity. Oh! the beauty of patriotic giving! In all the world there is no fountain of happiness whose waters flow forth so pure and sparkling! From now on it has become our pleasant destiny, whether we will or no, to vie with each other in giving to the Guard, and through it to the Nation, without thought of personal gain, whatever we can spare of manliness and courage, of ability, of time and money, of devotion, nobility and patriotism. And why should we not give freely and gladly, and with never a care for recompense? All nature points the way. "Full many a flower is born to blush unseen," and yet, year after year, far out on the untrod prairie, in the depths of forest and mountain, these self-forgotten flowers bud and blossom and die, with never a human eye to see, or human voice to say "how beautiful." The brook sparkles just as brightly and sings as musically amongst the inaccessible heights of the Sierras as if the world were looking on. The stars give us their steady glow, the moon showers down her silvery splendor, just the same, whether the world admires with wondering eyes, or in indifference folds those eyes in sleep. The ocean swells its mighty minuet along, without a solitary ship to mark the rhythm of its movement. The hand of the Creator with infinite art paints the sunset with colors just as wonderful, as varied and soul-inspiring above the pathless deserts, as when above the poet, artist-haunted shores of Italy. Shall man be less generous than nature? The soldier niggardly with his strength, his skill and courage? The patriot with his devotion? Shall we hold back our little gifts when Omnipotence sets so royal an example? Shall we throw aside great opportunities, hinder and delay great national advancements, through our petty ambitions and jealousies?

As every gift is minified by the insignificance, or dignified

and ennobled by the grandeur of its object, therefore, it is ours to know that each one's gift, however poor or small it be, when offered to his country will be multiplied a thousand fold by the worthiness and glory of that to which it is given. Within a century a new order has arisen—a radiant sisterhood of republics. France, Switzerland, Mexico, the All-Americas, and Brazil, are worthy members, whilst Spain, Portugal, and Great Britain are already swiftly journeying on to join the order. Comrades, our lives will scarce have run their courses ere every nation on the globe will have come within this magic circle. But of all this glowing sisterhood Columbia stands pre-eminent, peerless, exemplar, high-priestess, queen of all. Radiant in her vigorous strength and beauty, her smile spreading beneficence, prosperity and happiness on every side,—her gracious voice speaking words which know no malice, but are fraught with peace and charity for all,—whilst on her brow a loving people have set a blazing circlet, with every gem a star and every star a state.

Oh, friends, comrades, let me appeal to you to join with me in putting our ambitions by. Let us remember that it is not the rank that tells, but the man beneath the uniform. Let us be content, glad, happy to wear the eagle, the silver leaf, or leaf of gold, the double or the single bar, whatever it is ours to have, until such time as we are called to higher responsibilities, or if need be, till our last tour of duty's done. Let us grasp the Army's outstretched hand and with it join in friendly rivalry, each one to find some worthy gift and lay it at the feet of our thrice blessed, our glorious Columbia.

CORRESPONDENCE

BETWEEN

GEN. KELTON AND COL. TURNER.

LETTER OF
GENERAL J. C. KELTON,

Adjutant-General U. S. Army.

WAR DEPARTMENT,
ADJUTANT-GENERAL'S OFFICE,
WASHINGTON, November 30, 1889.

COL. HENRY L. TURNER, Chicago, Illinois.

Dear Sir—Your letter of the 25th instant is received, from which it appears that doubts are held in certain localities as to the President's authority under the Constitution to assemble or call out the *militia* voluntarily, or by requisition, for any other purpose than to repel invasion or suppress insurrection; and in a quoted article which you enclose, it is declared the militia can not be called out even for instruction, and that in time of peace the National Guard of the different states and the troops of the Army can not be legally put under one commander. Many accept these doubts, and will admit the force of first interpretation of the Constitution referred to; but certainly few will admit the last. The National Guard is not *militia*. The militia is a compulsory force; the National Guard is a volunteer force of the several states, as the Regular Army is a volunteer force of the United States. They are both armed and equipped by the United States. It is not possible by the militia system of the Constitution and laws to afford an adequate system of national defence, whereas the Regular Army and National Guard can do so, and it is and

must be upon these that Congress and the people must rely for the national defence, and this fact Congress and the people must recognize.

There is no doubt in the minds of military men of the power of Congress to provide for calling volunteers into the service of the United States for military instruction. Congress has power by the Constitution to provide for the common defence and general welfare of the United States, to raise and support armies, and to make all laws which may be necessary and proper for carrying into execution the foregoing powers. (Sec. 8, Cons.) The organic law could not give plainer and more comprehensive authority for national defence. Under these provisions Congress can provide for calling volunteers (National Guardsmen) into the service of the United States for military instruction for such periods, long or short, as Congress may deem best.

The provisions of the Constitution concerning the militia do not conflict with or weaken the foregoing powers to provide for the national defence. It is necessary to put into the strongest light possible the two systems of national defence, in order that the people and Congress may judge them and choose between them. The one (militia) is compulsory and has proved utterly worthless; the other (National Guard) is full of promise, backed by good performance. It is for Congress to decide which system shall be adopted. The militia system being dead, it will be useless for Congress to make appropriations for its support. But national defence is necessary, and the present practicable and efficient volunteer system is one which Congress should promptly make adequate appropriations for. The act of mustering in and mustering out the National Guard would be of great advantage in the way of instruction of the guardsman, as well as to the Regular Army, and would lead to facility as well as economy in that important service when war breaks out.

If Congress acts at all upon the question of bringing the National Guard into national existence, and associating it with the Regular Army, it must do so under its power, "To

raise and support armies," Sec. 8, Clause 12, of the Constitution, and whether it will do so now depends upon the popular view in regard to the urgent need of preparation for the national defence. This is a matter for public opinion to influence.

The subject of national defence is a very important one. To prominent military men there is no doubt that the preparations for "raising armies" should begin at once, and in the most direct and practical manner. To secure this end it is only necessary to convince the people of its importance, and show them what difficulties stand in the way; that done, Congress will find means to overcome the difficulties.

Section 8, Clause 12: Congress shall have power to raise and support armies.

Under this power, Congress finding a volunteer force in the service of the several states, armed and equipped by the United States, can, under the Constitution, give authority to the Executive to call it forth, in whole or part, for a period of nine months, and when mustered into the service of the United States, it will be paid as Congress may direct, either given the present pay for the full period, or such exceptional pay for a short period as will be just and equitable, so as to render the force most contented.

To raise an army includes the authority to have it in every respect in readiness to call into existence. To do this necessitates Congress, not only to arm and equip the men who are to compose it, but secure them all needful instruction to take the field, as an army is required to do in these days, upon brief notice.

It is a plain duty, therefore, for Congress, if the nation is to be defended, to authorize the President to call forth the state volunteer force, which it has armed, as often and for such length of time as may be necessary to render it an effective defensive force for the Government.

Very respectfully,

(Signed)

J. C. KELTON,

Adjutant-General.

LETTER OF COLONEL TURNER.

CHICAGO, November 29, 1889.

GENERAL J. C. KELTON,

Washington, D. C.

Dear Sir:—It has occurred to me that we could perhaps get this matter before the country in effective shape by means of a conference between Regular Army officers and officers of the National Guard, to be held in Washington some time during the month of January, to consider plans for a closer union between the Army and the Guard, and for giving greater efficiency and uniformity to our organization; the conference to be made up of officers chosen for the purpose from the different states and such officers of the Army as might seem to you advisable to have present, and that certain questions for discussion and consideration be announced in advance, that should the conference be able to unite upon any plan of action that it recommend to the governors of the various states and to Congress such action as might give practical effect to the plans decided upon. If such plan would meet your approval, and if you will drop me a line, I will present a resolution in our own association, after the delivery of my address, to the effect that the association appoint certain delegates to attend the conference and one member of the general committee of arrangements to have charge of organizing the meeting.

This letter will reach you Monday, and if you reply by return mail, I shall have it Wednesday in time for use.

Yours sincerely,

HENRY L. TURNER.

TELEGRAM FROM GENERAL KELTON.

WASHINGTON, December 3, 1889.

COL. H. L. TURNER,

Western Publishing House, Chicago, Ill.

Arrangements now being made by National Guard Association to call convention. National Guard officers meet in Washington January or February; object exactly what you suggest; would be exceedingly good idea for you to have your association appoint delegates to attend proposed convention.

J. C. KELTON,

Adjutant-General.

LETTER OF
BRIG.-GENERAL ALBERT ORDWAY,

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA.

LETTER OF
BRIGADIER-GENERAL ALBERT ORDWAY,

NATIONAL GUARD, DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA.

WAR DEPARTMENT,
ADJUTANT-GENERAL'S OFFICE,
WASHINGTON, December 2, 1889.

COL. HENRY L. TURNER, Chicago, Ill.

Dear Sir—I take pleasure in sending you herewith a copy of a letter from General Ordway, commanding the District of Columbia Militia, on the subject of military instruction of the National Guard.

This interesting letter presents concisely, but clearly, the views of a prominent and enthusiastic National Guardsman, as to what can be done to bring the Regular Army and the National Guard into closer professional relations.

Very truly yours,

J. C. KELTON,

Adjutant-General.

HEADQUARTERS
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA MILITIA,
WASHINGTON, D. C., November 30, 1889.

GENERAL J. C. KELTON, *Adjutant-General U. S. Army:*

Sir—I have the honor to acknowledge receipt of your letter asking my views on the question whether "Congress can

make any law, subject to the Constitution, that will enable the President to call out any portion of the militia for instruction," and whether the President can "assemble or call out the militia, either voluntarily or by requisition, for any other purpose than to repel invasion or suppress internal disturbances."

These are questions that involve such legal and constitutional questions that they appear somewhat beyond the judgment of a military officer; but having given the subject some consideration within the past few years, I will not hesitate to give you the opinions I have formed on them.

I believe that the Constitution gives far greater power to the General Government over the militia than it has ever attempted to exercise, or has ever asserted. The powers of the General Government never having been exercised or asserted, the idea has become fixed that the militia is made up of purely state organizations, maintained for the purpose of supporting the civil authorities, and enforcing the laws of the states. If the question is examined closely, I think it will be conceded that this is not the fact, and that it was not so designed by the framers of the Constitution. One of the principal purposes of organizing a federal government is expressed in the preamble of the Constitution to have been "to provide for the common defense," and the theory of the framers of the Constitution is acknowledged to have been opposed to a standing Army, and depending on an organized militia of the people. The clause of the Constitution relating to the militia, as originally reported from committee to the Federal Convention, made the militia a wholly national organization, and solely under control of the General Government—a motion to make it an organization controlled solely by the states received only one vote; and, finally, like most provisions of the Constitution, a compromise was adopted and the clause modified to give the states the power of appointing the officers, which the opponents of the clause as originally reported stated, "was all the security they needed."

The clause, as finally adopted, reads that Congress shall have power—

“To provide for organizing, arming and disciplining the militia, and for governing such part of them as may be employed in the service of the United States, reserving to the states, respectively, the appointment of the officers, and the authority of training the militia according to the discipline prescribed by Congress.”

Analyze this clause, and it will be conceded that the only unlimited power reserved to the states is that of appointing the officers. They are to train the militia; but they must do it according to the discipline prescribed by Congress, and the word discipline, as used here, does not mean simply tactics or drill-book, but the wider signification in which the word at that time was used, as evidenced by the reply of the Committee to a question asked on the floor of the Federal Convention, as to what they meant by the word “discipline.”

I believe that the militia was intended to be a national organization, organized, armed, and disciplined by the National Government for the purposes of common defence, and that the only concession made was to allow the states to appoint the officers.

Holding this extreme view of the powers of the Federal Government, I nevertheless confess that I would not be in favor of now resorting to them. The Federal Government has allowed these powers to remain dormant and unasserted for a hundred years, until the states have grown up with the idea that the militia is and was designed to be simply their local police.

This being the case, it is better now to induce the states, rather than try to force them; though it might be pertinent to ask the states that if their view is correct, why should the Federal Government supply arms, equipments, uniforms, and supplies, and require annual reports from the states as to the number and condition of their militia.

I have only briefly stated these views as leading up to a

reply to your question, "whether Congress can make any law subject to the Constitution, that will enable the President to call out any portion of the militia for instruction." The question can possibly be best answered by the men who framed the Constitution, whose opinions I will cite before giving you my own conclusions.

Washington submitted to Congress the first plan for organizing the militia under the Constitution, which was devised by his Secretary of War, Knox. It proposed that no person should be entitled to exercise the rights of citizenship until he produced a certificate that he had served thirty days in a camp of instruction when eighteen years of age, thirty days in his nineteenth year, and ten days in his twentieth year, and that the General Government should provide him with uniform and equipments and bear all the expenses of the annual camps.

In 1794 a committee of the House of Representatives reported a bill to organize a "select corps" of militia—a volunteer militia—to be armed and equipped by the General Government, *and paid for service in annual camps of instruction*. And from that time down to the time when all effort ceased from exhaustion, the same proposition was made by successive Congresses, and successive Presidents, in various forms.

Jefferson, who represented the party of strict constructionists of the Constitution, urged camps of instruction at the expense of the General Government. Madison, who was the "Father of the Constitution," in 1810 recommended that the commissioned and non-commissioned officers of the militia be assembled in annual camps of instruction, at the expense of the General Government. In 1817 President Monroe's Secretary of War, Graham, recommended that the militia be classified according to age, and the younger classes required to assemble annually in camps of instruction at the expense of the General Government.

In 1825 President Adams recommended that select corps of militia be formed, that their officers be assembled in annual camps of instruction, and paid for their time and mileage, that

the office of Adjutant-General of militia be created, and that on application of State Executives, the United States should furnish officers to instruct the annual camps. In 1840 President Van Buren's Secretary of War, Poinsett, proposed to Congress that they enact a law to authorize the President to order the active militia into the service and pay of the United States, for thirty days in each year to place them in camps of instruction.

This is only a brief statement of a small selection of many similar propositions; but sufficient, I should judge, to show that the men who framed the Constitution had no doubt of its intent, and that it gave power to provide that the militia, or any designated part of them, could by law be assembled in camps of instruction, and paid by the General Government.

Without all this light of precedent propositions, the interpretation of the Constitution would still appear clear to me. It says that Congress shall have power to provide for disciplining the militia—therefore Congress can by law enact, require, and enforce that the militia, or any designated part of it, shall go into camps of instruction at designated times for ten, thirty, sixty days or any period it may deem proper, and it may of course allow and provide that they shall be paid during that time. The only limitation of the extent to which this power may be exercised is under another provision of the Constitution that the militia cannot be called into the service of the United States, and thereby governed by the United States, except in case of invasion or insurrection; and therefore, the President could not, under the Constitution, call any portion of the militia to be actually mustered into the service of the United States for purposes of instruction. Nor could law constitutionally enact a requirement that the militia of a state should go into camps of instruction outside of its state, but there is nothing to prevent their voluntarily doing so.

My view is that the suggestions made by you in your article in the *Forum*—that provision be made for organizations

of the National Guard to go into camp or participate in field manœuvres with the Army and to be paid by the General Government—is possible and desirable, and perfectly feasible under the militia law, with a single exception that they could not be mustered into the service of the United States during that time; if, however, it was deemed essential, or desirable that the force under instruction should be actually mustered into the service of the United States, for the time being, there is authority for such law under another clause of the Constitution, which grants power to Congress to raise armies. Under this clause of the Constitution, law could be enacted for the raising of volunteers for instruction, for thirty days' service, who could be actually mustered into the service of the United States. In other words, the President cannot call out militia or accept the service of volunteers to be mustered into the service of the United States, except in case of invasion or insurrection; but Congress can enact a law requiring militia to go into camps of instruction, under their own officers, in their own states, for any length of time and pay them for it, or it may enact a law authorizing the organization of volunteers for thirty or more days in camps of instruction anywhere within the limits of the United States, to be mustered into service and paid by the United States, and any members or organization of the volunteer militia could enlist in such volunteers.

I regret that I have been obliged to write so hurriedly, that I could not make the expression of my views more concise.

Respectfully yours,

ALBERT ORDWAY,

Brigadier General, D. C. M.

LETTER OF
COLONEL J. G. GILCHRIST,
THIRD IOWA INFANTRY.

LETTER OF
COLONEL J. G. GILCHRIST,

COLONEL THIRD IOWA INFANTRY.

IOWA CITY, IOWA, December 12, 1889.

LT. COL. H. L. TURNER, *First Regt. Ill. Nat. Guard*:

Dear Sir:—I have now secured a promise of ten companies, each of thirty men, two buglers, and three officers, for the proposed joint encampment; five (5) from my own command, and one (1) each from the other regiments in our Guard. They all make the question of pay the crucial test, as most of them will be obliged to pay substitutes in their business during their absence. I am now ready to coöperate with you, in any way you see fit. I would suggest that you draw up a memorial to Congress, making the tender of service for thirty days, and secure the signatures of the officers of your regiment, those of the Wisconsin battalion, and then send it to me to circulate in my command. There should be an estimate of expense included, including reasonable pay for officers and men. This could be presented by some influential Congressman, of your selection, and receive the endorsement of Generals Schofield, Crook and Kelton. As far as *we* are concerned, the question of pay is the main thing. As to my own state, if the matter should go through Congress, I would ask an ordinary encampment of my command earlier than usual, to get them in shape for field work. All things now seem to be ready for a "general assault."

Very respectfully,

J. G. GILCHRIST,

Colonel Third Iowa Infantry.

RESOLUTIONS OF THE
ILLINOIS NATIONAL GUARD
ASSOCIATION.

RESOLUTIONS OF THE ILLINOIS NATIONAL GUARD ASSOCIATION.

WHEREAS : The officers of the Association of the National Guard of the State of Illinois have read with interest and with pleasure the very vital recommendations affecting the National Guard of the entire country, as well as the permanent establishment, which recommendations are embodied in Gen. J. C. Kelton's article on the requirements of national defence published in the November number of the *Forum*, and, further, in the last report of the Adjutant General of the Army to the Secretary of War :

THEREFORE, be it *Resolved*, that a vote of thanks be extended to him by the Association for so clearly, intelligently, and patriotically defining the needs of the National Guard of the country with a view to improving its standard of military efficiency; and further be it

Resolved, That this association believes that the suggestions made by General Kelton are practicable and calculated to advance our highest interests.

WHEREFORE, be it further *Resolved*, That we call upon the Congressional representatives and legislators from this state, to use all honorable means to carry these recommendations into effect and to secure the \$2,000,000 appropriation suggested.

Be it also *Resolved*, That five delegates be appointed to attend a proposed conference of National Guard and Regular Army officers to be held in Washington during January or February next.

Be it further *Resolved*, That a copy of these resolutions be transmitted by the president of this association to the Adjutant General of the United States Army, the Adjutant General of this state, and also to the Adjutant General of every other state in the Union having an equipped and uniformed body of the National Guard, also to our senators and representatives in Congress.

Resolved: That this association respectfully request the Governor of Illinois, our Commander-in-Chief, to designate some officer to attend the conference of Army and National Guard officers to be held in the City of Washington early next year, as the official representative of this state.

WHEREAS: Colonel Turner has given the first initiative to this movement so far as Illinois is concerned:

Resolved, That he be appointed a special delegate to the conference at Washington, charged with all preliminary arrangements for the Illinois delegation.

LIST OF DELEGATES
TO THE
WASHINGTON MEETING.

BRIGADIER-GENERAL J. W. VANCE, Adjutant-General Illinois.
Official Representative of the State. Appointed by the Governor.

BRIGADIER-GENERAL JASPER N. REECE, 2d Brigade,
President Association. (Ex-Officio.)

COLONEL CHARLES R. E. KOCH, First Infantry.

COLONEL GEORGE C. RANKIN, Assistant Adjutant-General.

LIEUTENANT-COLONEL FLORENCE ZIEGFELD, I. S. A. P.
First Brigade.

LIEUTENANT-COLONEL JAMES M. RICE, A. I. G.,
Second Brigade.

MAJOR ALFRED J. BRADFORD, Fourth Infantry.

LIEUTENANT-COLONEL HENRY L. TURNER, First Infantry.

